While it is a well established fact that hundreds of millions, if not billions, of Albanian public money have been wasted over the years on corrupt infrastructure projects, it is not every day that we are able to trace the actual genealogy of a single corruption case: to understand how the levers of governmental power are used to get public money into private pockets.
The dossiers of the Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) concerning the construction of the Llogara tunnel, an infrastructure project connecting the heart the country directly to the southern riviera, offer us a rare insight into such details. The investigations have recently led to the charges against Belinda Balluku, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure and Energy, confirming earlier allegations made by another former Deputy Prime Minister, Arben Ahmetaj. Notably, this is only one of several infrastructure projects tendered under Balluku in which SPAK suspects faul play.
The Llogara dossier starts with the preparation of the tender documents on December 9, 2020 based on a draft proposal provided by Joseph Obeid, a consultant for Hill International NV, a Dutch company that has registered its Albanian branch office in 2019. Hill International has come to Albania as the co-recipient of a €2.8 million technical assistence contract of the EU Delegation in Tirana to provide “a team of experts that will identify the needs and assist and train the beneficiary institutions/agencies for upgrading their capacities for the implementation of infrastructure projects.”
A Bid Evaluation Committee is established at the Ministry of Infrastructure and Energy (MIE), including a certain Evis Berberi, then director of the Agency for Energy Efficiency. This committee will review the offers for meeting the technical criteria and rank them based on the price offered. Two days later, on December 11, the tender is announced, with a bidding deadline of February 12, 2021.
Two construction companies file complaints over the tender requirements, resulting in the reduction of the timeframe within which companies are allowed to have prior experience with similar projects, from 5 to 3 years. Communications between Minister Balluku and Berberi, who features as her point person on the matter, reveal that this happened at the request of a certain “Pëllumb,” possibly the owner of a construction company that did not fulfill the 5-year criterion. Hill International’s technical assistance project director at the MIE, Giannis Kirkinezis, helps draft this amendment to the annexes of the tender. Minister Balluku is less than amused. She asks Berberi, “Did we change at the tunnel [tender] the experience with similar objects from 5 years to 3???”
The tender procedure continues and the deadline is extended to March 1, 2021. Eventually six companies place a bid. The lowest bid is made by a joint venture of Albanian company Gjoka Konstruksion and the Turkish company Duygu Muhendislik Insaat Turizm Dis Ticaret Ve Sanayi at about €140 million. On March 5, Berberi messages Balluku: “Do we have a deadline and target?” Suggesting that the minister provide guidance on the timeframe for finishing the bid evaluation (“deadline”) as well as the desired winner (“target”).
Twelve days later, around noon, Balluku again writes Berberi, “What about the tunnel? Did you finish [the evaluation]?” Berberi responds, “Nooo, it’s bad. Let’s talk in person, not write.” Despite Berberi’s cautionary note, the two continue to exchange messages about Gjoka Konstruksion. There is a problem with awarding them the winning bid, since they don’t comply with some of the formal criteria. By the end of the afternoon, Balluku gives up: “I think that we should just cancel. Disqualify all [bidders].” Berberi immediately replies, “I totally agree. Something doesn’t seem right in all of this. When do you want it [done], today or tomorrow? Anyhow, if you need it, I will sing along, I don’t care about anyone and will get it to where it should go,” implying that he is fully in control of the outcome.
But Balluku replies that given the situation she doesn’t want anyone to win the bid: “No, no, I have that sense that it should not [go to anyone].” Berberi replies, “Your sense is frightening. When do you want it [canceled]?” The next day, she gives the order: “Haven’t you notified the others about the cancellation? Finish today, urgently.” The Bid Evaluation Committee cancels the tender, and by the end of the afternoon Berberi writes to Balluku: “We’re done.” All of this, an EU-assisted public infrastructure tender costing millions of taxpayer money, closed down on a hunch.
Procedures are rapidly set in motion to re-announce the Llogara tender, in the hope – no doubt – of an outcome that “feels” better. On May 23, Balluku writes Berberi: “When are you opening [the] Llogara [tender] because I’m about to explode.”
Three days later she writes that she is promoting him to head the Albanian Road Authority (ARRSh). I cite here the entire message, because it clearly illustrates the clientelism that is endemic throughout the Rama government:
Dear Visi, our relation has gone through many ups and downs, but what is important is that I consider you one of my closest people. Different from previous times, this time I am giving you something on which my future, yours, and that of many others around us depends. If you would fail in this new duty, be assured that it would be a great blow to me and the failure relates to the works, deadlines, relations with people, and rumors that will circulate. I want you to take this very seriously, I want you to reflect on it, so that next Monday is a new stage in your professional life. Hermeticism, no meetings, no promises, you should be present at every work site and not take decisions without consultation. Don’t disappoint me! Enjoy, you have just been appointed.
On May 31, 2021 Berberi is appointed Director of the ARRSh. A few days later, Balluku travels to Ankara, Türkiye together with Prime Minister Edi Rama and then Deputy Prime Minister Ahmetaj to meet with infrastructure companies.
On June 21, 2021 the MIE reannounces the tender for the Llogara tunnel, with a submission deadline on July 28. A new Bid Evaluation Committee is established headed by Berberi, now the new ARrSh director. In the tender documents, the criterion for prior experience is reverted back to 5 years, while an additional clause is added that for joint ventures, this criterion needs to be fulfilled by the leading company. In other words, this absolves subcontractors from complying with the same criterion.
On July 27, the bidding deadline is extended to August 30. The reason for this extension becomes clear in the context of a message that Balluku forwards to Berberi on August 19. The message in full reads:
İNTEKAR YAPI TUR.ELEKT.INŞ.SAN. and TİC. LLC. as a company, our Llogara Tunnel Tender works and paperwork have been completed at the level of 95% and our cost studies continue. We made a Joint venture by taking the company ASL INŞ.TAAH.VESAN.TİC.LTD.ȘTİ. with us. It is a company that has built a 2x14 km Highway Tunnel in Turkey, it is also a company that Mr. President knows, recognizes and is a reference. Both our representative in Albania and our lawyers in Albania continue their work and negotiations with [MIE consultant] Mrs.Arta [Gurabardhi] about the tender. At our Ankara Headquarters, our engineers both complete the paperwork for the tender and continue the cost studies. In addition, on 18.08.2021, our company managers and engineers from Turkey will come to Albania to see the route and the place where the tunnel will be built and to finalize the details. As a company, we will be fully ready for the Llogara tunnel tender before the tender date. We offer our respect.
But despite these good intentions, things don’t progress as planned. While indeed an engineer of the Turkish joint venture visits Albania between August 18 and 21, he apparently doesn’t meet with Balluku, who writes to Berberi on August 24: “[…] The Turks are nowhere. Meet tomorrow at 11 and let’s activate what we discussed Friday.” On Friday, August 27, the deadline is once again extended, to September 7. On August 30, Berberi finally meets the representatives of the İntekar–ASL joint venture in Tirana.
On September 7, five bids have come in, including one by the İntekar–ASL joint venture at about €190 million. Berberi immediately sends a screenshot of the list to Balluku. İntekar–ASL has placed the second lowest bid. Balluku is happy: “In brief, it appears we’re doing excellent!” Berberi confirms that the difference between the lowest bid and the one by İntekar–ASL is only €10 million and that he will “look into it.” Balluku responds, “Of course some idiot went lower, but surely they don’t meet the [tender] criteria.” And indeed, all bids end up disqualified except the one by İntekar–ASL. Its main Albanian subcontractor: Gjoka Konstruksion. On September 26, they are announced the winning bid for the Llogara tunnel tender.
But not all is quiet. On October 15, Democratic Party (PD) deputy Arbi Agalliu accuses Balluku of rigging the tender in favor of the Turkish company, whose directors she would have met during her visit to Ankara in early June. He announces that the PD will send the case to SPAK. Behind the scenes, Balluku attempts some damage control. She writes Berberi, “I’ll bring you for a meeting with Arber Agalliu, a PD deputy who has a couple of questions about two plots of land he has in Vlora, one near the [Vlora] bypass and one at the highway entrance.” And later, “But we can’t do anything about it, let him get a building permit from the municipality, so let’s hope.”
As a brief coda to this first act, let us also briefly mention the tender for the supervision of the construction work on the Llogara tunnel, which was won by a joint venture of Hill International NV – the very same Dutch ompany that had helped draft the tender documents for the Llogara tunnel – and the Albanian company Net-Group. And Net-Group would be the first domino to fall.
On March 14, 2024, SPAK arrests businessman Valter Begaj, owner of Net-Group. Net-Group had received multiple tenders from ARRSh director Berberi, including the tender for the supervision of the Llogara tunnel construction works. Kickbacks from these tenders to Berberi, amounting to about €2 million, were funneled through a second company that was sold back and forth between Berberi, Begaj, and other accomplices for arbitrary sums of money. Berberi is arrested as well.
As promised, on August 12 the PD files a complaint with SPAK against Balluku, claiming that İntekar–ASL artificially inflated their offer, that Gjoka Konstruksion, as a subcontractor, has been doing all the actual construction work, and asking where the difference of nearly €50 million between Gjoka’s initial bid and İntekar–ASL’s winning bid went.
This leads a year later to the indictment of the members of the Llogara Tunnel Bid Evaluation Committee and Balluku herself. On November 19, 2025, The Special Court of First Instance for Corruption and Organized Crime (GjKKO) relieves her of her government duties and confiscates her passport. Several other infrastructure tenders, including the supervision of the Llogara tunnel construction, remain under investigation.
Gjoka Konstruksion itself has so far not been affected by the proceedings against Balluku, even though it is not the first time the company appears in the context of questionable infrastructure tenders. For example, in 2017 they caught the headlines when making an “unrequested offer” for development of the Rruga e Arbrit despite the absence of any documented experience with such projects. A large financial guarantee was pledged – once again – by a “friendly” Turkish company. And as in 2021, Gjoka won the 2017 tender again owing to the disqualification of the other bidders.
Besides the financial damage to the government budget, these corrupt infrastructure tenders also have a real effect on road safety. The Rruga e Arbrit continues to be plagued by inundation, landslides, and collapsing road segments. Other multi-million-euro infrastructure projects tendered under Ballaku and Berberi suffer a similar fate. This does not bode well for the safety of the Llogara tunnel, whose construction is apparently supervised by an EU-funded Dutch consultant fishing for side-gigs and the company of a now criminally indicted businessman.
All of this does not necessarily bode well for Prime Minister Rama, either. There is a risk that the botched implementations of Balluku’s corrupt infrastructure tenders may cause disasters and even cost lives. And as we know from Serbia, where the collapse of the roof of Novi Sad train station in November 2024 has led to extensive and persistent anti-government protests, this may have serious consequences for his grip on power and the internationally coveted “stability” of the country.
But so far, Prime Minister Rama has continued steadfast in his support for Balluku, who was reconfirmed as minister after the general elections in the spring – despite SPAK’s already ongoing investigations. Meanwhile, the EU Ambassador reiterated the timeless mantra of “presumption of innocence.” Let us join him, and for now presume that a prime minister who has lost two deputy prime ministers, several ministers, and his favorite mayor to sprawling corruption cases, is equally innocent!
