How can politics and ethics be reconciled, or, to put it differently, how can the tension between them be managed? This is the dilemma the renowned German sociologist Max Weber explored in his lecture "Politics as a Vocation," delivered to the "Free Students' Association" in January 1919, during the short-lived Munich revolution. More than a century later, his work still serves as a strong reminder of the overlapping dangers of demagoguery, personalized leadership, and improvisation.
Although it seems utopian today to fully answer the question of what the ethical essence of politics is, the answer would be incomplete if it were limited only to the contrast between the "ethic of conviction" and the "ethic of responsibility." According to Weber, the former concerns moral force, while the latter is a true political calling that requires a genuine commitment to a major cause, accompanied by the exercise of a profound sense of responsibility.
I called upon Weber to better understand the paradoxical situation in which the EU enlargement and consolidation process finds itself. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, most of the European political elite believe that the expansion and consolidation of the European project are necessary and inevitable, but at the same time, impossible.
Missed Opportunities
Since that dramatic moment for Europe's security, three opportunities have been lost.
Firstly, Europeans were not able to capitalize on the Ukrainians' resistance in the east of the continent to conclude the unfinished conflicts of statehood in Southeastern Europe, in order to concentrate on the long-term confrontation with Russia in the east.
In the current devastating geopolitical context, the main EU member states chose the shortest path with the Western Balkans, concluding several agreements driven by the obsession with migration (Italy-Albania); access to natural resources (Germany-Serbia); access to the military industry (France-Serbia). This reinforced the belief that the Western Balkans, although geographically surrounded by the EU, are treated as a periphery where the 'troubles' of the EU's big players can be solved.
In terms of security and politics, the Western Balkans is far from being a region in the true sense of the word with common goals. More than two decades of investment in a policy focused on Serbia or on its good relations with Albania for the sake of regional stability, has resulted neither in its democratization nor in Serbia's adoption of the common European foreign policy.
Even at this point, the EU again found a shortcut by imposing restrictive measures on Kosovo, even though it is well known who incites the unrest in the region, and that the state of Kosovo, from its very first day, has been aligned with the West.
Although Albania has cultivated a foreign policy approach aligned with the West since the fall of the communist regime, it strangely and publicly asked the EU "not to put pressure on Serbia to join the sanctions against Russia." Meanwhile, on the other hand, it did not hesitate to publicly warn against the unfair restrictive measures the EU placed on Kosovo. It even went so far as to cancel the joint governments meeting as a sign of distancing itself from the latter.
Not even the terrorist attack in Banjska, which, unlike other conflicts in Europe, was an aggression instigated by an EU candidate country against a neighboring country aiming for EU membership, changed the pragmatic and strategically visionless compass of the EU towards the region. Reproachful statements toward Belgrade were not accompanied by concrete actions in any instance.
Therefore, no one should be surprised by what is happening in Serbia today. The reason why the students who have been protesting for a year in the streets of Serbia are not waving the EU flag should be sought in the fact that the EU has preached more than it has fought for the implementation of democratic standards and European values in our region. It is not an exaggeration to say that the EU, with the policy it has pursued, has lost Serbia, in addition to losing its investment: Aleksandar Vučić.
Secondly, President Biden's administration did not produce the desired changes in the region. Although Biden will perhaps be remembered as the last Atlanticist president in the White House, his thesis of a divide between democracy and autocracy did not take effect regarding the challenges of democracy and the rule of law in Southeastern Europe. As one of the most prominent political scientists in the US, Ian Bremmer, stated on my "Public Square" podcast, "The US had that position in 1989 when the 'Berlin Wall' fell. But in 2024, the idea that an American president says 'the US will distinguish between democracies and authoritarian regimes' is not very credible, it does not reflect reality."
In our region, elections have lost their significance. What Tocqueville once defined as their "surprise effect," due to the state of excitement that grips society during an electoral process and the fact that the election result cannot be predicted beforehand or changed afterward, is gone. In contrast to most Western countries and Central and Eastern European countries, which experienced frequent changes of power while joining the EU, the longevity and personalization of power are distinguishing features in the Western Balkans. Even in cases where political rotation has been enabled, it has not been accompanied by a transformative agenda and a forward-looking vision.
Similarly, regional initiatives with an economic background, which were supported by the Biden administration under the principle "let's do business first, then politics," did not achieve the expected results and did not help to mitigate disagreements and transform former enemies into good neighbors.
Thirdly, Germany under Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke of "Zeitenwende" (a turning point) and promised in its governing program an "acceleration" of the EU accession process for the Western Balkan countries, which did not happen. To date, every wave of EU membership has had Germany as the driving force, combined with leading coalitions from member states pushing the process forward.
Let us not harbor any illusions. The encouraging words of the enlargement commissioner regarding negotiation chapters, frontrunner countries, and possible EU accession dates must align with the reality on the ground regarding the state of democracy, the rule of law in the economy, state capture, media freedom, the inclusion of the opposition, civil society, academia, and business as an integral part of the enlargement process. Simultaneously, these words must align with the political commitment of the main EU countries and the practice of previous enlargement rounds.
The same approach was followed with the 2018 Enlargement Strategy, where the then enlargement commissioner declared that: "Serbia and Montenegro, as two frontrunner countries, will be able to join the EU in 2025." Looking seven years later, I think that, in any circumstance, words must be based on concrete actions, as otherwise they risk producing the scene of "double pretense," which we have witnessed several times, where on one hand, the Western Balkan countries pretend to be "reforming," and on the other hand, the EU pretends to be "enlarging."
The Gap Deepens
Although there has been a new geopolitical moment in Europe since February 24, 2022, the enlargement process is still a side story, part of a much bigger narrative about the future of Europe, war, relations with other global powers, its strategic autonomy, and security architecture.
Yes! The EU enlargement policy has been revived as a geostrategic necessity after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with the prospect of Ukraine and Moldova's membership, as well as membership talks with Montenegro and Albania, or with the European Commission's approval of the new growth plans and facilitating instruments, tailored to the specific profiles of the countries involved in the enlargement process.
But this is not enough! The Economic Growth Plan offers only a small recalibration of the status quo in relations between the EU and the Western Balkans in the new geopolitical context, with limited results, in the absence of the political ambition and institutional innovation necessary to signal a true progress toward EU membership. The Plan's measures are modest and are unlikely to reshape economic relations or change the development trajectory of the Western Balkans to achieve economic and developmental convergence with the EU average.
Instead, the Plan follows a gradual logic that adds to the already overcrowded landscape of political tools and financial instruments since the introduction of the Stabilization and Association Process in 1999. Which, to be fair, have expanded the EU's institutional and normative footprint in the region over the years, but have not enabled structural transformation. Instead of serving as an instrument for overcoming the challenges related to democratic backwardness, economic and social development, and full integration into the EU single market, the Growth Plan risks serving merely as an accompaniment to them.
Therefore, the persistent barriers regarding factors of production between the Western Balkans and the EU will continue, just as the facilitations in transfers and banking services for citizens and businesses from our region will be negligible compared to what the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) offers to citizens and businesses operating within the EU.
In the case of Central and Eastern European countries, integration into the EU single market was a major driver of regional cooperation and increased trade among them only after joining the EU, which attests to the irreplaceable role of the single market in economic development and rules-based trade. Therefore, the emphasis on the regional common market does not fulfill the need and aspiration of the Western Balkan countries for sustainable economic development.
If we compare the €2 billion grant of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans with the €357 billion grant for member states within the framework of the Next Generation EU, the contrast is chilling.
During the budgetary cycle, which coincides with the expressed ambition of the enlargement commissioner and Montenegro and Albania to conclude the EU membership negotiation process, the Western Balkans will receive grants from the EU, on average, worth up to €619 per capita. Meanwhile, per capita grants in the EU member states surrounding us in this corner of Europe range from €3,540 for Slovenians to €5,700 for Greeks, evidence that the development gap between us is not narrowing, but deepening.
Decisive Action, Not Gradualism
The project of European consolidation in our region requires decisive bilateral action and not gradualism to cement the status quo. It involves three things:
a) A credible promise coordinated between the European Commission and EU member states that every state can genuinely achieve membership. b) A cooperative internal political environment for the timeframe of implementing the reforms stemming from the negotiations, and a co-identifying one for the protection and promotion of national interests in the EU. c) Financial aid and support programs to meet standards and narrow the development gap.
To conclude again where I began, with Weber's haunting dilemma regarding the tension between the "ethic of conviction" (the consolidation of the European project is irreversible) and the "ethic of responsibility" (concrete work and readiness for sacrifice from those who want to become part of this project), although he acknowledged the moral force of the former, he supported the latter. Because a true political project, such as the consolidation of the European project, requires a fervent commitment and a deep sense of responsibility from both sides: the Western Balkan countries and the EU.
Original article in Albanian
